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Abst rac t 
Recent approaches to mobile code safety, like proof-carrying code, involve associ-
ating safety information to programs. The code supplier provides a program and 
also includes with it a certifícate (or proof) whose validity entails compliance with 
a predefined safety policy. The intended benefit is that the program consumer 
can locally validate the certifícate w.r.t. the "untrusted" program by means of a 
certifícate checker—a process which should be much simpler, eflicient, and auto-
matic than generating the original proof. We herein introduce a novel approach 
to mobile code safety which follows a similar scheme, but which is based through-
out on the use of abstract interpretation techniques. In our framework the safety 
policy is specified by using an expressive assertion language defined over abstract 
domains. We identify a particular slice of the abstract interpretation-based static 
analysis results which is especially useful as a certifícate. We propose an algorithm 
for checking the validity of the certifícate on the consumer side which is itself in 
fact a very simplified and eflicient specialized abstract-interpreter. Our ideas are 
illustrated through an example implemented in the CiaoPP system. Though further 
experimentation is still required, we believe the proposed approach is of interest 
for bringing the automation and expressiveness which is inherent in the abstract 
interpretation techniques to the área of mobile code safety. 
Key words: Mobile Code Safety, Certifying Compilation, 
Proof-Carrying Code, Abstract Interpretation, Static Analysis. 
1 Introduction 
One of the most important challenges which computing research faces today 
is the development of security techniques for verifying that the execution of 
a program (possibly) supplied by an untrusted source is safe, i.e., it meets 
certain properties according to a predefined safety policy. Recent approaches 
to mobile code safety involve associating safety information in the form of a 
certifícate to programs [?,?,?]. The certifícate (or proof) is created at compile 
time, and packaged along with the untrusted code. The consumer who receives 
or downloads the code+certificate package can then run a verifier which by 
a straightforward inspection of the code and the certifícate, can verify the 
validity of the certifícate and thus compliance with the safety policy. 
The key benefit of this "certificate-based" approach to mobile code safety 
is that the burden of ensuring compliance with the desired safety policy is 
shifted from the consumer to the supplier. The consumer's task is reduced 
from the level of proving to the level of checking. Indeed the verifier, or proof 
checker, performs a task that should be much simpler, efficient, and automatic 
than generating the original certifícate. Well-known methods following this ap-
proach are, among others, Proof-Carrying Code (PCC) [?], the Java bytecode 
verifier [?], and Typed Assembly Languages (TAL) [?]. An interesting point 
to note is that the certifícate may take different forms. For instance, in PCC 
the certifícate is originally a proof in first-order logic of certain verification 
conditions and the verification process involves checking that the certifícate is 
indeed a valid first-order proof. A recent proposal [?] uses temporal logic to 
specify security policies in PCC. In TAL, the certifícate is a type annotation 
of the assembly language program and the verification process involves a form 
of type checking. Nevertheless, the design of mobile code safety systems based 
on certificates shares the same, fundamental, challenges: 
(i) defining expressive safety policies covering a wide range of properties, 
(ii) solving the problem of how to automatically genérate the certificates and, 
(iii) designing simple, reliable, and efficient checkers for the certificates. 
The various approaches differ in expressiveness, flexibility, and efliciency, but 
they all share the common goal of using safety information to make the local 
execution of untrusted mobile code by the consumer safe and efficient. Our 
main contribution is to introduce a novel approach to certificate-based mobile 
code safety which follows the overall scheme, but which is based throughout 
on the use of the technique of abstract interpretation [?] in order to handle 
the fundamental and difficult issues mentioned above. 
A starting point of our work is the observation that the now well estab-
lished technique of abstract interpretation has allowed the development of 
very sophisticated global static program analyses which are at the same time 
automatic, provably correct, and practical. The basic idea of abstract inter-
pretation is to infer information on programs by interpreting ("running") them 
using abstract valúes rather than concrete ones, thus, obtaining safe approx-
imations of programs behavior. The technique allows inferring much richer 
information than, for example, traditional types. This includes data struc-
ture shape (like pointer sharing), bounds on data structure sizes, and other 
operational variable instantiation properties, as well as procedure-level prop-
erties such as determinacy, termination, non-failure, and bounds on resource 
consumption (time or space cost). CiaoPP [?] is the abstract interpretation-
based preprocessor of the Ciao multi-paradigm constraint logic programming 
system. It uses modular, incremental abstract interpretation as a fundamental 
tool to obtain information about the program. In CiaoPP, the semantic ap-
proximations produced by the analysis have been applied to high- and low-level 
optimizations during program compilation, including transformations such as 
múltiple abstract specialization, parallelization, and resource usage control. 
More recently, novel and promising applications of such semantic approxima-
tions have been proposed in the more general context of program development. 
In the context of the CiaoPP system, we herein introduce a novel approach 
to mobile code safety which follows a certificate-based scheme, but which is 
based throughout on the technique of abstract interpretation. The design of 
our abstract interpretation-based system is made up of three main elements: 
(i) An expressive assertion language used to define the safety policy. As-
sertions allow us to express "abstract"—i.e. symbolic—properties over 
different abstract domains. Our framework is parametric w.r.t. the ab-
stract domain of interest, which gives us generality and expressiveness. 
(ii) A fixpoint static analyzer is used to automatically infer information about 
the mobile code which can then be used to prove that the code is safe 
w.r.t. the given assertions in a straightforward way. We identify the 
particular slice of the analysis results which is sufncient for this purpose. 
(iii) A simple, easy-to-trust analysis checker verifies the validity of the infor-
mation on the mobile code. It is indeed a specialized abstract interpreter 
which does not need to itérate in order to reach a fixpoint (in contrast 
to standard analyzers). Efliciency is achieved by taking advantage of the 
analysis information gathered in a previous analysis phase. 
A main purpose of this paper is to give preliminary evidence that the automa-
tion which is inherent in the abstract interpretation techniques can be brought 
to the área of mobile code safety. The resulting scheme has been incorporated 
in the CiaoPP preprocessor and its efliciency is now in the process of being 
experimentally evaluated. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the assertion lan-
guage which is used to define our safety policy. Section 3 presents the cer-
tification process together with the generation of the verification condition 
to attest compliance with the safety policy. In Section 4, we introduce our 
abstract interpretation-based checking algorithm. Finally, Section 5 discusses 
the work presented in this paper together with related work. 
2 An Assertion Language to Specify the Safety Policy 
The purpose of a safety policy is to specify precisely the conditions under 
which the execution of a program is considered safe. In existing approaches, 
safety policies usually correspond to some variants of type safety (which may 
also control the correct access of memory or array bounds [?]). We propose the 
use of (a subset of) the high-level assertion language [?] available in CiaoPP to 
define the safety policy in the context of constraint logic programs. 
2.1 Preliminaries 
We start by introducing some notation and preliminary concepts on constraint 
logic programming [?] (CLP). Terms are constructed from variables (e.g., X), 
functors (e.g., / ) and predicates (e.g., p). We denote by {Xi i—• ti,..., Xn i—• 
tn} the substitution a with <J(X¡) = ti for all i = 1 , . . . , n (with X¿ ^ Xj 
if i j^ j) and cr(X) = X for any other variable X, where í¿ are terms. Á 
renaming is a substitution p for which there exists the inverse p~l such that 
pp~x = p~x p = id. 
A constraint is essentially a conjunction of expressions built from prede-
fined predicates (such as term equations or inequalities over the reals) whose 
arguments are constructed using predefined functions (such as real addition). 
An atom has the form p(ti, ...,tn) where p is a predicate symbol and the t¿ are 
terms. A literal is either an atom or a constraint. A goal is a finite sequence 
create_streams ( [ ] , [ ] ) . 
c r e a t e _ s t r e a m s ( [ N | N L ] , [ F | F L ] ) : -
number_codes(N,ChInN), genérate(ChInN,Fname), 
safe_open(Fname,write ,F) , create_streams(NL,FL). 
genérate(ChInN,Fname):- app("/tmp/",ChInN,Fname). 
safe_open(Fname,Mode,Stream):-
atom_codes(File ,Fname), open(Fi le ,Mode,Stream) . 
Fig. 1. Example mobile code 
of literals. A rule is of the form H:-D where H, the head, is an atom and 
D, the body, is a possibly empty finite sequence of literals. A constraint logic 
program, or program, is a finite set of rules. We assume that all rule heads are 
normalized, i.e., H is of the form p(Xi, ...,Xn) where Xi, ...,Xn are distinct 
free variables.1 
Example 2.1 Let us consider the CLP program in Figure 1. The main pred-
icate, create_streams/2, receives a list of numbers as first argument and 
returns in the second argument the list of file handlers (streams) associated 
to the opened files. Predicates number_codes/2, atom_codes/2, and open/3 
are ISO-standard Prolog predicates, and thus they are available in CiaoPP. 
In our example, the cali number_codes(N, ChlnN) receives the number N and 
returns in ChlnN the list of the ASCII codes of the characters comprising a rep-
resentation of N. Also, the cali atom_codes(File, Fname) receives in Fname a 
list of ASCII codes and returns the atom F i l e made up of the corresponding 
characters. A cali open(Fi le , Mode, Stream) opens the file named F i l e and 
returns in Stream the stream associated with the file. The argument Mode can 
have any of the valúes: read, write, or append. 
The auxiliary predicate genérate concatenates the prefix " / tmp/" to the 
number which receives as first parameter by using the well-known list concate-
nation predicate app/3 . Note that predicate create_streams does not cali 
the system predicate open directly, but instead calis the auxiliary predicate 
saf e_open. The reason for this will be discussed in Example 2.3. 
2.2 Abstract Properties 
Assertions are syntactic objects which allow expressing a wide variety of high-
level properties of (in our case CLP-) programs. Examples are assertions which 
state information on entry points to a program module, assertions which de-
scribe properties of built-ins, assertions which provide some type declarations, 
cost bounds, etc. A distinguishing feature of our approach is that safety 
properties are expressed as substüutions in the context of an abstract domain 
(Da) which is simpler than the concrete domain (D). An abstract valué is 
a finite representation of a, possibly infinite, set of actual valúes in the con-
crete domain. Our approach relies on the abstract interpretation theory [?], 
where the set of all possible abstract semantic valúes which represents Da is 
usually a complete lattice or cpo which is ascending chain finite. However, 
This is not restrictive since programs can always be normalized, and it will facilítate 
the presentation of the checking algorithm later. However, in the examples (and in the 
implementation of our framework) we use non-normalized programs. 
for this study, abstract interpretation is restricted to complete lattices over 
sets, both for the concrete (2D, C) and abstract (Da, Z) domains. Abstract 
valúes and sets of concrete valúes are related via a pair of monotonic map-
pings (o¡,7): abstraction a : 2D —• Da, and concretization 7 : Da —• 2D, such 
that \/x e 2D : j(a(x)) Z> x and Vy G Da: a(7(y)) = y. In general |Z is 
induced by C and a¡. Similarly, the operations of least upper bound (U) and 
greatest lower bound (l~l) mimic those of 2D in a precise sense. 
In this framework an abstract property is defined as an abstract substitution 
which allows us to express properties, in terms of an abstract domain, that 
the execution of a program must satisfy. 
The description domain that we use in our examples is a regular type do-
main [?]. We will often refer to this domain as eterms [?] since it is the ñame 
it has in CiaoPP. A regular type is a set of terms which can be described by 
a regular term grammar or, equivalently, by a finite tree automaton. In order 
to define a regular type, one can choose Regular Unary Logic programs as a 
representation of tree autómata (like [?,?]). We also adopt this representation 
as Ex. 2.2 will illustrate. Abstract substitutions in the eterms domain over a 
set of variables V assign a regular type to each variable in V. Apart from the 
user's defined regular types, in the eterms domain, we consider a number of 
distinguished symbols which correspond to predefined types. For instance, we 
will use in our examples term, which is the most general type, i.e., it corre-
sponds to all possible terms. The type cons t an t denotes functors with zero 
arguments, num, the set of all possible numbers, s t r i n g , lists of characters, 
l i s t , any possible list, io_term the modes of accessing files (i.e., w r i t e , r ead 
or append), and stream, handlers for sequential files. We allow parametric 
types such as l i s t ( T ) which denotes lists whose elements are all of type T. 
Note that the type l i s t is equivalent to l i s t ( te rm) . Clearly, l i s t ( T ) Z 
l i s t jZ term for any type T. In eterms, the most general substitution T as-
signs term to all variables in V. The least general substitution ± assigns the 
empty set of valúes to each variable. For brevity, in the examples we often 
skip variables whose type is the most general substitution (i.e., term). 
E x a m p l e 2.2 In the context of mobile code, it is a safety issue whether the 
code tries to access files which are not related to the application in the machine 
consuming the code. A very simple safety policy can be to enforce that the 
mobile code only accesses temporary files. For example, in a UNIX system this 
can be controlled (under some assumptions) by ensuring that the file resides 
in the directory / tmp/ . 
The Regular Unary Logic program safejiame in Figure 2 defines a reg-
ular type such that all its valúes satisfy this very simple notion of safety. 
The following abstract property made up of the abstract substitution {X 1—• 
saf ejname} expresses that X be bound to a string which starts by the prefix 
" / tmp/" followed by a list of alpha-numerical characters. In the following, we 
write simply saf e_riame(X) to represent the previous abstract substitution. 
The reg type declarations are used to define new regular types in CiaoPP. In 
fact, auxiliary predicates used to define a regular type, like alphanum_code, 
alpha_code, or num_code must be declared using r eg type as well. The con-
struction member(C,"0123456789") is a shortcut for expressing that C can 
correspond to any of the codes in the list from character 0 to 9. 
:- regtype safe_name/l. 
safe_name("/tmp/"|IL) :- list(L,alphanum_code). 
:- regtype alphanum_code/l. 
alphanum_code(X):- alpha_code(X). 
alphanum_code(X):- num_code(X). 
:- regtype alpha_code/l. 
alpha_code(A):- member(A,"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwzyz"). 
alpha_code(A):- member(A,"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ"). 
:- regtype num_code/l. 
num_code(C):- member(C,"0123456789"). 
Fig. 2. Regular types for the example 
2.3 The Safety Policy 
The original assertion language [?] available in CiaoPP is composed of several 
assertion schemes. Among them, we simply consider the two following schemes 
for the purpose of this paper, which intuitively correspond to the traditional 
pre- and postcondition on procedures. 
calis(B, {Ap r e ; . . . ; XPre\): They express properties which should hold in any 
cali to a given predicate similarly to the traditional precondition. i? is a 
predícate descriptor, i.e., it has a predicate symbol as main functor and all 
arguments are distinct free variables, and XPre, i = 1, . . . , n , are abstract 
properties about execution states. The resulting assertion should be inter-
preted as "in all activations of B at least one property XPre should hold in 
the calling state." 
success (B, [Xpre,]Xpost): This assertion schema is used to describe a post-
condition which must hold on all success states for a given predicate. In 
the assertion, i? is a predicate descriptor, and \pre and Xpost are abstract 
properties about execution states. \pre is optional and must be evaluated 
w.r.t. the store at the calling state to the predicate. However, the condition 
Xpost must be evaluated w.r.t. the store at the success state of the predicate. 
If the optional Xpre is present, then Xpost is only required to hold in those 
success states which correspond to cali states satisfying Xpre. Note that 
several success assertions with different Xpre may be given. 
Therefore, abstract properties Xpre and Xpost in assertions allow us to express 
conditions, in terms of an abstract domain, that the execution of a program 
must satisfy. Each condition is an abstract substitution corresponding to the 
variables in some atom. 
In general, it is the task of the compiler designer to define the safety policy 
associated to the system. In the CiaoPP precompiler, the above assertion 
language allows us to define the safety policy for the run-time system in the 
presence of foreign functions, built-ins, etc. 
Example 2.3 Figure 3 shows the assertions which are relevant to the program 
in our running example. The first four rows correspond to c a l i s assertions, 
whereas the last three are success assertions. Out of the four c a l i s , the 
first three are predefined in the system. The last user-defined assertion for 
predicate saf e_open provides a simple way to guarantee that all calis to open 
calls(number_codes(X,Y), {(num(X);list(Y,numcodes))j) 
calls(atom_codes(X,Y), {(constant(X);s t r ing(Y))}) 
calls(open(X,Y,_Z), {constant(X),io_mode(Y)}) 
calis(safe_open(Fname,_,_) , {safe_name(Fname)}) 
success(number_codes(X,Y), T , jnum(X),list(Y,numcodes)}) 
success(atom_codes(X,Y),T, {constant(X),str ing(Y)}) 
success(open(X,Y,Z), T , {constant(X),iojnode(Y),stream(Z)}) 
Fig. 3. Assertions for the example 
are safe. It can be read as "the calling conventions for predicate saf e_open 
require that the first argument be a saf e_name". Let us note that the actual 
implementation in the CiaoPP system also includes program point assertions [?] 
which avoid the use of auxiliary predicates such as this one. For simplicity, 
we do not discuss program point assertions here. The safety policy in our 
example corresponds to guaranteeing that the program satisfies all the seven 
assertions in the figure. 
The coexistence of different domains in CiaoPP [?] allows expressing a 
wide range of properties using the assertion language. They include modes, 
types, non-failure, termination, determinacy, non-suspension, non-floundering 
and cost bounds. We believe that cost bounds will have an impact for safety 
purposes. For instance, an assertion can be used to require that the cost 
of a predicate be linear: an erroneous implementation with quadratic cost 
would be rejected in this case. However, the cost is a property about the 
global computation of the predicate rather than the input-output behavior. 
In CiaoPP they are expressed by means of a different assertion scheme, namely, 
comp assertions which allow expressing properties of computations. 
In contrast to other approaches, assertions are not compulsory for every 
predicate. This is important since assertions have to be provided manually. 
Thus, the user can decide how much effort to put into writing assertions: 
the more of them there are, the more complete the partial correctness of the 
program is described and more possibilities to detect problems. However, 
pre- and post-conditions are often provided by programmers since they are 
often easy to write and very useful for generating program documentation. 
Furthermore, assertions are helpful but not actually required in order to obtain 
information about the program: the analysis algorithm is able to obtain safe 
approximations of the program behavior even if no assertions are given. This is 
not always the case in other approaches such as classical program verification, 
in which loop invariants are actually required. Such invariants are hard to find 
and existing automated techniques are generally not suflicient to infer them, 
so that often they have to be provided by hand. 
3 Certifying Programs by Static Analysis 
This section describes the certification process, i.e., the generation of a certifí-
cate to attest the adherence of the program to the safety policy. The whole 
certification method is based on the following idea: a particular slice of the 
analysis results computed by abstract interpretation-based fixpoint algorithms 
can play the role of certifícate for attesting program safety. Intuitively, our 
certification process performs the following steps. We start from a set, AS, of 
assertions which establishes the safety policy associated to a program, P, in 
the context of an abstract domain, Da, as defined in Sect. 2. Firstly, a stan-
dard program analyzer is run, which returns, among other data structures, an 
answer table, AT, encoding relevant information about P ' s execution (in terms 
of the abstract domain Da). Secondly, a verification condition, VC(AS, AT), 
is generated from AS and AT in order to attest compliance of P with respect 
to the safety policy. The condition VC(AS, AT) is sent to an automatic veri-
fier which attempts to validate it. If it succeeds, AT constitutes the certifícate 
and can be sent to the consumer together with the program P. Sections 3.1 
and 3.2 give further details on elements AT and VC(AS, AT), respectively. 
3.1 Using Analysis Results as Certificates 
A main idea in our certification process is that the certifícate is automatically 
generated by a fixpoint abstract interpretation-based analyzer. In particular, 
we rely on the goal dependent (a.k.a. goal oriented) analyzer of [?] which is the 
one implemented in the CiaoPP system. This analysis algorithm (we simply 
write Analysis for short in the following) receives as input, in addition to 
the program P, a set of calling patterns. A calling pattern is a description of 
the calling modes (or entries) into the program. In particular, for an abstract 
domain Da, a set of calling patterns Q consists of a set of pairs of the form 
(A : CP) where A is a predicate descriptor and CP is an abstract substitution 
(i.e., a condition of the run-time bindings) of A expressed as CP G Da. 
In order to compute Analysis(P,Q, Da), traditional (goal dependent) ab-
stract interpreters for (C)LP programs construct an and-or graph (or analysis 
graph for short) which corresponds to (or approximates) the abstract seman-
tics of the program [?]. The graph has two sorts of nodes: or-nodes and 
and-nodes. Or-nodes correspond to literals whilst and-nodes to rules. Both 
kinds of nodes are connected as follows. Or-nodes have ares to those and-
nodes which correspond to the rules whose head unifies with the literal. An 
and-node for a rule H :- B>i,... ,Bn has n ares to the or-nodes which corre-
sponds to the literals in the body of the rule. Due to space limitations, and 
given that it is now well understood, we do not describe here how to compute 
the and-or graph, or equivalently, Analysis(P,Q,Da). More details can be 
found in, e.g., [?,?,?]. 
The analysis graph computed by CiaoPP's abstract interpreter is repre-
sented by means of two data structures in the output: the answer table and the 
are dependeney table. The following defmition introduces the notion of analy-
sis table (similar defmitions can be found, e.g., in [?,?,?]). Informally, it says 
that its entries are of the form (A : CP i—• AP) which should be interpreted 
as "the answer pattern for calis satisfying precondition (or cali substitution), 
CP, to A accomplishes posteondition (or success substitution), AP." 
Definition 3.1 [Analysis answer table] Let P be a program. Let Q be a set 
of calling patterns expressed in the abstract domain Da. We define an analysis 
answer table, AT, as the set of entries (Aj : CPj i—• AP,}, \/j = \..n computed 
by Analysis(P,Q,Da)[7] where, in each entry, Aj is an atom and CPj and 
APj are, respectively, the abstract cali and success substitutions. 
Intuitively, the answer table contains the answer patterns for all literals 
in the or-nodes of the graph while the are dependeney table keeps detailed 
information about dependencies among or-nodes in the graph. A central 
idea in this work is that, for certifying program safety, it suffices to send the 
information stored in the analysis answer table since, in contrast to the original 
generic algorithm [?], a simple analysis checker can be designed for validating 
the answer table without requiring the use of the are dependeney table at all 
(as we show in Sect. 4). The theory of abstract interpretation guarantees that 
the answer table is a safe approximation of the runtime behavior (see [?,?,?] 
for details). 
Example 3.2 Reconsider the program of Example 2.1 and the abstract do-
main eterms enhanced with the regular type declaration saf ejname of Ex-
ample 2.2. Take the calling pattern (create_streams(X, Y), { l i s t (X , num)}}, 
which indicates that initial calis to c rea te_s t reams are performed with a list 










l i s t (A ,num) 
num(A) 
l i s t (A,numeodes) 
A = " / t m p / \ 
l i s t (B ,numeodes ) 
s f (A) ,B=wri te 
sf(B) 
c o n s t a n t ( A ) , 
B=write 
Success Pattern 
l i s t ( A , num),list(B, stream) 
num(A), l i s t (B,numeodes) 
l i s t ( A , n u m e o d e s ) , s f ( B ) 
A = " / t m p / \ 
l i s t ( B , n u m e o d e s ) , s f ( C ) 
s f (A) ,B=wr i te , s t r eam(B) 
c o n s t a n t ( A ) , s f ( B ) 
cons t an t (A) ,B=wr i t e , 
stream(C) 
For instance, the first entry should be interpreted as: all calis to predicate 
c rea te_s t reams provide as input a list of numbers in the first argument and, 
upon success, they yield lists of numbers and streams, respectively, in each 
of its two arguments. It is interesting to note that CiaoPP generates the 
auxiliary type sf ( " / t m p / " | |A) : - l i s t (A,numeodes) . to represent lists of 
numbers starting by the prefix " / tmp/" . Clearly, sf C safejiame. This will 
allow CiaoPP to infer that calis to open performed within this program satisfy 
the simple safety policy discussed in Ex. 2.2. Moreover, we use the notation 
Var = constant to denote that the system generates a new type whose only 
element is this constant, as it happens: for w r i t e , in the entries for saf e_open 
and open and, for " / tmp/" , in the entry for app. 
In order to increase aecuracy, analyzers are usually multivariant on calis 
(see, e.g., [?]). Indeed, though not visible in this example, CiaoPP incorpo-
rates a multivariant analysis, i.e., more than one triple (A : CP\ i—• APi ) , . . . , 
(A : CPn i—• APn) n > 1 with CPi ^ APi for some i,j may be computed for 
the same predicate descriptor A. 
3.2 The Verification Condüion 
In the next step, the code supplier extraets a Verification Condüion (VC) 
which can be proved only if the execution of the code does not viólate the 
safety policy. For an initial set of assertions, we define our VC as follows. 
Definition 3.3 [Verification Condition] Let P be a program, Q a set of calling 
patterns in the abstract domain Da and AT its analysis answer table. Let S 
be an assertion. Then, the verification condition, VC(S, AT), for S w.r.t. AT 
is defined as follows: VC(S, AT) ::= 
A ^CP) E Akec V . . . V
 P(CP) Z X-rec) 
{A:CP^AP)GAT 
if S = calis(B, {Ap r e c ; . . . ; Aprec}) 
< 
f\ p(CP) n \Prec = ± v p(AP) z \Post 
{A:CP^AP)GAT 
if S = success(B, Aprec, \post) 
where p is a variable renaming substitution of A w.r.t. i?. 
If AS is a finite set of assertions, then the verification condition of AS, i.e., 
V(AS, AT), is the conjunction of the verification conditions of the elements 
oíAS. 
Roughly speaking, the VC generated according to Def. 3.3 is a conjunc-
tion of boolean expressions (possibly containing disjunctions) whose validity 
ensures the consistency of a set of assertions w.r.t. the answer table computed 
by Analysis. It distinguishes two different cases depending on the kind of 
assertion. For calis assertions, the VC requires that at least one precondition 
XPrec be a safe approximation of all existing abstract calling patterns for the 
atom B. In the case of success assertions, there are two cases for them to hold. 
The first one indicates that the precondition is never satisfied and, thus, the 
assertion trivially holds (and the postcondition does not need to be tested). 
The second corresponds to the case in which the success substitutions com-
puted by analysis for the predicate are more particular than the one required 
by the assertion. Let us illustrate this definition by means of an example. 
E x a m p l e 3.4 Consider the answer table generated in Example 3.2 and the 
calis and success assertions of Figure 3. According to Def. 3.3, the VC is: 
(num(X) Z (num(X); l i s t (Y , numcodes))A 
sf(Y) jZ (constant(X); str ing(Y))A 
constant(X), Y = w r i t e Z constant(X), io_mode(Y)A 
sf (X) jZ safe_name(X)A 
num(X), l i s t ( Y , numcodes) Z num(X), l i s t ( Y , numcodes)A 
constant(X), sf (Y) Z constant(X), str ing(Y)A 
constant(X), Y = w r i t e , stream(Z) Z constant(X), io_mode(Y), stream(Z)) 
Each conjunct corresponds to an assertion in Fig. 3 in the same order they 
appear there. Thus, the first four conjuncts are for the calis assertions and 
the last three for the success assertions. The validity of the whole conjunction 
can be easily proved by taking into account the following (trivial) relations 
between the elements in the domain: 
sf (X) Z s t r ing(X) 
X = w r i t e Z io_mode(X) 
Note that the first two conjuncts contain a disjunction in the right condition. 
In the second one, the condition sf(Y) Z (constant(X); s t r ing(Y)) holds 
because sf (Y) jZ s t r ing(Y) . 
Therefore, upon creating the answer table and generating the VC, the 
validity of the whole boolean condition is checked by resolving each conjunct 
separately. Note that each conjunct consists of comparisons of pairs of abstract 
substitutions, which simply return either true or false but do not compute 
any substitution. This validation may yield three different possible status: 
i) the VC is indeed checked, as it happens in the above example; ii) it is 
disproved, and thus the certifícate is not valid and the code is definitely not 
safe to run (we should obviously correct the program before continuing the 
process); iii) it cannot be proved ñor disproved, which may be due to several 
circumstances. For instance, it can happen that the analysis is not able to infer 
precise enough information to verify the conditions. The user can then provide 
a more refined description of initial calling patterns or choose a different, finer-
grained, domain. In both the ii) and iii) cases the certification process needs 
to be restarted until achieving a VC which meets i). 
Finally, let us mention that some works investigate how to minimize the 
trusted computing base in order to achieve more trustworthy systems. Founda-
tional PCC [?,?] eliminates the VC generation process and, instead, requires 
all program analysis to be incorporated logically in the proof at the cost of 
augmenting the proof size. The main advantage is that the PCC implemen-
tation is expected to contain about an order of magnitude less trusted code. 
Recently, Configurable PCC [?] proposes a method for implementing a PCC 
system based on a VC generator that is mostly untrusted. This is achieved 
by using methods to verify each execution of the untrusted generator rather 
than the code itself. The adaptation of the ideas in [?,?,?] to our framework 
may be subject of future research. 
The following theorem states the soundness of the VC. Intuitively, it 
amounts to saying that if the VC holds, then the execution of the program 
will preserve all safety assertions. Following the notation of [?], we write \>VC 
when VC is valid. 
Theorem 3.5 (Soundness of the Verification Condit ion) LetP he a pro-
gram, AS be a set of assertion, Q be a set of calling patterns in an abstract 
domain Da. Let AT be an analysis answer table for P, Q and Da as defined in 
Def 3.1. Let VC(AS, AT) be the verification condition from AT and AS gen-
erated as stated in Def. 3.3. If >VC(AS,AT), then P satisfies all assertions 
in AS for all computations described by Q. 
Proof. [sketch] The proof of the theorem is a direct consequence of the fact 
the static analysis algorithm computes a safe approximation of the stores 
reached during computation. • 
4 Checking Safety in the Consumer 
After certifying the safety of the code, the supplier sends the program together 
with the certifícate to the consumer. To retain the safety guarantees, the 
consumer can trust neither the code ñor the certifícate. Thus, in the validation 
process, a code consumer not only checks the validity of the certifícate w.r.t. 
the program but it also (re-)generates a trustworthy VC. This section describes 
only the former part of the validation process, since the latter is identical to 
that already discussed in the previous section. 
There are at least three reasons for requiring the validation process to be 
eflicient and driven by a simple algorithm. First, the implementation of the 
checking algorithm is part of the safety-critical infrastructure and we want 
to minimize it. Second, the local host could be a small embedded system 
that lacks computing resources to run large and complex programs. Third, 
the checking will be performed by every consumer (whilst the certification 
generation is done only once by the supplier). 
As already mentioned, Analysis plays the role of the certifícate generator 
in our approach. Although global analysis is now routinely used as a practical 
tool, it is still unacceptable to run the whole Analysis to validate the certifí-
cate since it still involves considerable cost. One of the main reasons for this 
is that the fixpoint algorithm is an iterative process which often recomputes 
answers (repeteadly) for the same cali due to possible updates introduced by 
further computations. At each iteration, the algorithm has to manipúlate 
rather complex data structures—which involve performing updates, lookups, 
etc.—until the fixpoint is reached. The whole validation process is centered 
around the following observation: the checking algorithm can be defined as 
a very simplified "one-traversal" analyzer. Intuitively, the computation of a 
fixpoint algorithm, such as Analysis, can be understood as: 
Analysis = fixpoint(analysisstep) 
We write explicitly fixpoint to highlight that the analysis can be seen as 
an iterative process which repeatedly performs a traversal of the analysis 
graph (denoted by analysisstep) until the computed information does not 
change, i.e., it reaches a fixpoint. The novel idea is that the simple, non-
iterative, analysisstep process can play the role of abstract interpretation-
based checker. In other words, check = analysisstep. This is justified by 
the assumption that the certification process already provides the fixpoint re-
sult in the form of certifícate. Thus, as long as the answer table is valid, an 
additional analysis traversal over it—or equivalently one single execution of 
analysisstep—cannot change the result. 
The next definition presents our abstract interpretation-based checking al-
gorithm. It takes as input: a program P, an initial set of calling patterns 
Q in an abstract domain Da, and its certifícate Cert (which is the analysis 
answer table). In a single traversal, it constructs a program analysis graph 
for P and Q by using the information in Cert. The algorithm is devised as a 
graph traversal procedure which places entries in a local answer table, AT, as 
new nodes in the program analysis graph are encountered. Thus, it handles 
two distinct answer tables: the local AT + the incoming Cert. The final goal 
of the checking is to reconstruct the analysis graph and compare the results 
with the information stored in Cert. As long as Cert is valid, both results 
coincide and, thus, the certifícate is guaranteed to be valid w.r.t. the program. 
Otherwise, the checker reports an error and rejects the program. 
Definition 4.1 [Abstract Interpretation-based Checker] Let P be a program 
and Q be a set of calling patterns in the abstract domain Da. Let Cert be a 
safety certifícate as defined in Def. 3.1. The validation of Cert is performed 
by the procedure check depicted in Figure 4. 2 The algorithm uses a local 
answer table, AT, to compute the results (initially it does not contain any 
entry). Procedure check is defined in terms of five abstract operations [?] on 
the description domain Da of interest: 
• Arestrict( GP, V) performs the abstract restriction of a description GP to the 
set of variables in the set V, denoted vars{V); 
2
 Following the presentation of Analysis [?], we assume that the program P and the answer 
table are global parameters throughout the algorithm. 
check(<5, Ceri) 
foreach A:CPeQ 
process_node(A : CP, Ceri) 
r e tu rn Va lid 
process_node(A : CP, Ceri) 
if (3 a renaming a s.t. a(A : CP i—> AP) in Ceri) 
t hen add (A:CP^ AP) to AT 
else r e tu rn Error 
foreach rule Ak <- Bk>1,..., Bk%nk 
W := vars(Ak,Bk}1,...,Bk,nk) 
CPb :=Aextend((7P, vars{Bkí\,.. 
CPRb := Arestrict(CP6,PM) 
foreach Bk¿ in the rule body i 
in P 
•,Bk,nk)) 
= l , - , n f e 
CPa := process_arc(5fe)i : CPRb,CPb,W, Ceri) 
if (i O nk) then CPRa := 
CPb := CPa 
CPRb := CPRa 
APi := Arestr\cí(CPa,vars(Ak)) 
AP2 := Alub(APi, a-^AP)) 
Arestrict(CPa, f ar 
if AP O AP2 t hen r e tu rn Error 
process_arc(Pfc;¿ : CPRb, CPb, W, Ceri) 
if Bk)i is a constraint then CPa '•= 
elseif (/3 a renaming a s.t. a(Bki : 
t hen process_node {Bki : CPRb 
Aadd (5 fe) i,C^,) 




AP\ := Aextend (p~1(AP), W) where p is a renaming s.t. 
p{Bk,, 
CPa :=Aconj (CP^APr) 
return CPa 
: CPRb i-> AP) in AT 
Fig. 4. Abstract Interpretation-based Checking in CiaoPP 
• Aextend (CP, V) extends the description CP to the variables in the set V; 
• Aadd(C, CP) performs the abstract operation of conjoining the actual con-
straint C with the description CP; 
• Aconj(CPi, CP2) performs the abstract conjunction of two descriptions; 
• Alub(CPi, CP2) performs the abstract disjunction of two descriptions. 
The checking algorithm proceeds as follows. For each calling pattern in 
the set Q, the procedure process_node inspects all rules defining the considered 
atom. For each rule, it performs a left-to-right traversal of the atoms in the 
rule body. The processing of each atom Bk¡i in the rule body is handled by 
process_arc. We refer by CPb to the description of the program point immedi-
ately before the atom Bk¡i and by CPa to the description after processing the 
atom. Initially, the description CPb takes the valué of the initial description 
CP for the calling pattern A : CP (extended to all the variables in the rule). 
We use the variables CPRX to denote that the description CPX has been re-
stricted, with x G {a, b}. The procedure process_arc is aimed at computing the 
resulting description CPa after processing a given atom Bk¡i. It distinguishes 
two different cases depending on the form of the atom: 
• Constraints are simply abstractly added to the current description. 
• If Bk,i is an atom, then it inspects whether it has been processed before: 
• If the atom has an entry in the answer table, we do not need to recompute 
the answer for the same atom. Indeed, this could risk the termination of 
the algorithm. 
• Otherwise, we process it by executing procedure process_node. On return, 
and in the absence of errors, this processing will have placed an answer 
for Bk,i in the answer table (and possibly for other related atoms as well). 
Either way, there will be an answer for the atom at this point. This answer 
is conjoined with the description CPj, from the program point immediately 
before B\.¿ in order to obtain the description for the program point after it. 
The computed result is used to process the next literal in the rule when Bki 
is not the last literal. Otherwise, the computed result constitutes indeed the 
computed answer for the rule. The answer is combined with the corresponding 
answer supplied by the certification process in Cert. If Cert is valid, the com-
parison should hold; otherwise the process prompts an error and the program 
is not safe to run. 
This algorithm is a simplified versión of that in [?] in two main ways. One 
is that no control structure is needed in order to guarantee that a fixpoint is 
reached. This eliminates the need for the "event queue" of [?]. The second 
is that since only one traversal of the analysis graph is to be performed, no 
detailed dependency information is required. This eliminates the need for the 
"dependency are table" of [?]. 
An example of the validation process can be found in the Appendix. Fur-
ther insights on the operations on abstract substitutions (like extensions, re-
strictions, etc.) can be found in [?]. Correctness results will appear in an 
extended versión of the paper. 
The following theorem states the partial correctness of the checking algo-
rithm of Def. 4.1. Informally, it ensures that algorithm check is able to validate 
safety certificates which are stored in an analysis answer table. 
T h e o r e m 4.2 (pa r t i a l co r rec tness ) Let P be a program, let Q be a set of 
calling patterns in an abstract domain Da. Let Cert be an analysis answer 
table as stated in Def. 3.1. Then, operation check(Q, Cert) terminates and 
validates Cert in P. 
5 Discussion 
The idea of using the results of abstract interpretation for program verification 
and debugging is not new. Analysis results allow proving that the program 
is corred w.r.t. non-trivial correctness conditions. This is also the case in 
CiaoPP, whose combination of abstract interpretation with a flexible assertion 
language opens the door to many uses of abstract interpretation for program 
development. 
In this paper, we have introduced a novel approach to mobile code safety 
which follows the standard strategy of associating safety certificates to pro-
grams, proposed by PCC and related techniques, but which is based through-
out on the use of abstract interpretation. In particular, it differs from PCC 
in the following aspeets. In our case, the burden on the consumer side is 
reduced by replacing an analysis phase with a simple one-traversal abstract 
interpretation-based checker. The certifícate takes the form of a particular 
slice of the analysis results generated by an abstract interpreter. The cer-
tifícate checker on the consumer side is itself in fact a very simplified and 
efficient specialized abstract-interpreter. The importance of our defmition of 
the checker comes from the fact that, while abstract interpretation is a pow-
erful technique, in return it is not without cost: the results it provides are 
guaranteed to be correct and often sufficiently precise in order to be useful, 
but obtaining analysis results is a costly task, mainly due to the fact that an 
analysis fixpoint has to be reached. The checker that we have proposed, on 
the other hand, greatly reduces the cost on the receiving side. 
Another notable difference is that that our scheme is completely defined 
at the source-level, whereas in PCC and related approaches the code supplier 
typically packages the certifícate with the untrusted object code rather than 
with the source code. From our point of view these two approaches are of 
interest. In many cases the source code is simply not available to the consumer. 
Even when there is a choice between object and source code, using object code 
has the clear advantage that the trusted computing base in the consumer is 
reduced since there is no need for a compiler. 
However, open-source code is getting much more relevant these days. As a 
result, it is now realistic to expect that a relatively large amount of untrusted 
source code is available to the consumer. Part of our interest in open-source 
is due to the fact that Ciao is itself a GNU-Licensed Prolog System based on 
the availability of the source code for its reviewing and modification. 
The advantages of open-source with respect to safety are important since 
it allows inspecting the code and applying powerful techniques for program 
analysis and validation which allow infering information which may be difficult 
to observe at low-level, compiled code. This enables handling more involved 
properties which in turn allow more expressive safety policies. Therefore, we 
share with PCC the idea of reducing the load in the consumer but our method 
is somehow applied in a different manner. 
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A Example of Analysis Checking 
Consider again the program of Ex. 2.1, now in normalized form: 
create_streams(X,Y) :- X=[] ,Y=[] . 
create_streams(X,Y):- X=[N|NL], Y=[F|FL], 
number_codes(N,ChInN), genérate(ChInN,Fname), 
safe_open(Fname,write,F), create_streams(NL,FL). 
the calling pattern (create_streams(X, Y), { l i s t (X , num)}} and the answer ta-
ble, denoted by Cert, of Ex. 3.2. We describe the more representative steps 
that algorithm check performs in order to validate the answer table. First, 
procedure process jnode looks up an answer for the initial calling pattern in 
Cert and adds the entry 
(create_streams(X, Y) : l i s t ( X , num) i—• AP = l i s t ( X , num), l i s t ( Y , s treams)) 
in the answer table AT (note that, for short, we use AP to denote this partic-
ular answer pattern). Since there are two rules defining c rea te_s t reams the 
outermost loop performs two iterations: 
I t e r 1. We start by describing the processing of the first rule (although the or-
der is irrelevant). Since the first atom X=[] in the rule body is a constraint, 
its description is computed within procedure process_arc by adding its ab-
stract description, i.e., { n i l ( X ) } , to the initial description { l i s t (X , num)}, 
resulting in { n i l ( X ) } . Similarly, the analysis for the second constraint adds 
{ n i l ( Y ) } to the former description producing {ni l (X) , n i l ( Y ) } . Upon ex-
iting the innermost loop, the disjunction of this description with the answer 
stored in Cert is calculated: 
AP := Alub ({nil(X),nil(Y)},AP) 
since nil(X) C l i s t ( X , num) and the same happens for Y. Thus, the certifí-
cate holds for this rule. 
I t e r 2. In the second iteration, we find six atoms in the rule body. Thus, the 
innermost loop performs the following six steps. The first two traversals deal 
with the constraints for X and Y, and are similar to I t e r 1. They produce 
the calling pattern { l i s t (X,num) , r t 2 ( Y ) } where the auxiliary regular type 
r t 2 is created by CiaoPP to represent a term whose top-level functor is a 
list constructed with F as head and FL as tail. For simplicity, we just write 
this description as { l i s t (X,num) ,Y=[F|FL]} in the following. 
The next atom, number_codes, in the rule body is not a constraint, thus, 
process_arc checks whether it has been processed before. Since this is not 
the case, it recursively executes process_node in order to get an answer for 
it. By using its predefined definition, that process.node gives the answer 
{num(N) , l i s t (ChInN,numcodes)} for it. This answer is conjoined with 
the description of the program point inmediately before the atom, i.e.: 
{ l i s t (X , num), Y = [F|FL], num(N), l is t (ChInN, numcodes)} : = 
Aconj ({num(N), l i s t (ChInN, numcodes)}, { l i s t (X , num), Y = [F|FL]}) 
Similarly, nodes g e n é r a t e and saf e_open are processed producing the final 
description after processing saf e_open, labeled as CP: 
CP = {list(X,num),Y = [stream|FL], num(N), 
l is t (ChInN, numcodes), sf (Fname), stream(F)} 
Finally, there is another cali to c rea te_s t reams . Now, process_node finds 
out that AT already contains an answer pattern for this predicate. Then, 
both calling patterns are conjoined: AP := Aconj (CP, AP) . Upon return 
from process_arc, it performs the disjunction of the computed answer with 
the answer supplied by Cert: AP := Alub(v4P, AP) . Since the result AP 
coincides with the one in the certifícate, the proof is validated and the 
algorithm terminates in a single graph traversal for the initial query. 
